Section One: Introduction

Purpose of the Report This report aims to provide a comprehensive comparative analysis of the changes introduced by Federal Decree-Law No. (41) of 2024 concerning the issuance of the Personal Status Law (hereinafter referred to as the "New Law"), in comparison with Federal Law No. (28) of 2005 concerning Personal Status and its amendments (hereinafter referred to as the "Old Law"). The New Law represents a significant legislative update in the field of personal status in the United Arab Emirates, reflecting societal and human rights developments. Article Four of the New Law's issuing decree explicitly states that the New Law replaces the Old Law and repeals any provision that contradicts or conflicts with its provisions.

Date of Enforcement and Repeal According to Article Five of the New Law's issuing decree, this Decree-Law shall be published in the Official Gazette and shall come into force six months after the day following its publication date. Pursuant to Article Four of the same decree, Federal Law No. (28) of 2005 is repealed.

Methodology This report will follow an objective comparative methodology between the two laws, highlighting amended articles, new provisions in the New Law, and articles that were repealed or omitted from the Old Law. The analysis will be supported by the legal texts provided in the attached documents.

Section Two: Substantive and General Amendments This section addresses the fundamental transformations in the legal framework that have broad implications for various aspects of personal status law.

A. Primary Sources of Law in the Absence of Specific Legislative Text The New Law witnessed a shift in determining the sources the judge refers to in the absence of a specific legislative text governing the matter at hand. Old Law: It mandated reference to the principles and rules of Islamic jurisprudence (Usul al-Fiqh) for understanding, interpreting, and construing texts. In the absence of a text, it required judgment according to the predominant opinion of the Maliki school, then the Hanbali school, then the Shafi'i school, then the Hanafi school. New Law: It introduced a change in this order. If the judge finds no text in the New Law, they shall rule according to Islamic Sharia, taking into account the selection of the most appropriate solutions as required by the interest (maslaha). If none is found, the judge shall rule according to custom ('urf), provided it does not conflict with the provisions of Islamic Sharia, public order, or public morals. This change represents a profound transformation. The New Law moves from strict adherence to a specific hierarchy of traditional Sunni jurisprudential schools to a more flexible approach centered on "the interest" within the broader framework of Islamic Sharia, and elevates "custom" as a subsequent source. The emphasis on "the interest" grants judges greater discretion in interpreting and applying Sharia principles to new situations or where traditional rulings might conflict with contemporary societal interests. This is likely to lead to more dynamic and evolving jurisprudence in personal status matters in the UAE. Furthermore, granting custom an official, albeit secondary, status as a source of law acknowledges the practical realities and diverse social customs within the state, allowing for legal solutions more attuned to prevailing societal practices, provided they meet ethical standards and Sharia requirements. The principle of "the interest" can also be a means for courts to consider beneficial international standards or best practices in family law, provided they do not contradict fundamental Sharia constants, which may facilitate greater international legal cooperation and understanding.

B. Official Calendar System for Calculating Legal Periods A change occurred in the approved calendar system for calculating periods stipulated in the law. Old Law: It stipulated the adoption of the lunar (Hijri) calendar for periods mentioned in the law, unless otherwise specified. New Law: It adopts the Gregorian calendar for periods mentioned, unless otherwise specified. This is a practical update that aligns legal timeframes with the predominantly used civil and commercial calendar, simplifying calculations and reducing potential confusion. The use of the Gregorian calendar standardizes time calculations across other legal and administrative domains in the state, which predominantly use this calendar, thereby improving the efficiency of record-keeping, court scheduling, and deadline calculations for all parties involved. However, this shift requires careful attention to ensure the substantive intent behind time-bound provisions is preserved or intentionally modified, as some rights and obligations are time-sensitive (e.g., 'iddah period, statute of limitations for claims). For example, an 'iddah period of "three months" will be slightly longer under the Gregorian calendar compared to the Hijri calendar, unless the numerical values in the New Law are adjusted (the New Law noted this in Article 84, which specified "three lunar months" for some 'iddah cases, but the general rule is Gregorian).

C. Scope of Application of the Law The New Law introduced precise amendments to its scope of application. Old Law: It applied to all events that occurred after its entry into force, with retroactive effect on divorce attestations and divorce lawsuits in which a final judgment had not been issued. It applied to UAE citizens unless non-Muslim citizens had special provisions for their sect and community. It applied to non-citizens unless one of them insisted on applying their own law (subject to exceptions in Articles 12 to 17, 27, and 28 of the Civil Transactions Law). New Law: Applies to UAE citizens if both parties to the relationship, or one of them, is Muslim. Applies to non-Muslim UAE citizens, unless they have special provisions for their sect and community or have agreed to apply another law permitted by the prevailing legislation in the UAE. Applies to non-citizens unless one of them insists on applying their own law or any other law agreed upon for application that is permitted by the prevailing legislation in the UAE. Applies to all events that occurred after its provisions came into force, and applies retroactively to divorce attestations, divorce lawsuits, and lawsuits for proof or denial of paternity in which a final judgment has not been issued. It is noted that the New Law refines applicability, particularly for non-Muslim citizens by allowing them to agree on another applicable law. It also expands retroactive effect to include claims for proof or denial of paternity. Allowing non-Muslim citizens to agree on applying another law (if permitted by UAE legislation) grants them greater flexibility and respects their communal or personal preferences in personal status matters. The inclusion of "claims for proof or denial of paternity" within the scope of retroactive application indicates an intention to apply new rules, potentially more modern or decisive (such as those related to DNA evidence), to pending sensitive family disputes, aiming for faster and more accurate resolutions.

D. Framework for Issuing Implementing Regulations, Guidelines, and Judicial Manuals The New Law established a more comprehensive and detailed framework for issuing executive rules. Old Law: Contained scattered references to the Minister of Justice issuing regulations for specific matters (e.g., Article 8 for attestation procedures, Article 16 for the Family Guidance Committee, Article 27 for marriage officials (Ma'zoun), and Article 154 for visitation of the fostered child). New Law: Provides a comprehensive and centralized mandate to the Federal Judicial Council and competent local judicial authorities to issue a wide range of specific regulations and manuals. It also allows the Council of Ministers to assign the execution of provisions related to maintenance, its collection, and the visitation and handover of the fostered child to other governmental or private corporate entities. The New Law establishes a more organized and expansive framework for developing detailed implementing rules, ensuring consistency and providing practical guidance across various procedural and substantive areas. The delegation of enforcement is a significant practical innovation. Tasking specific bodies (Federal Judicial Council, local judicial authorities) with issuing detailed regulations on various topics promotes greater specialization and aims for more unified practices. Also, the provision allowing the Council of Ministers to assign the enforcement of maintenance judgments and the handover of the fostered child to other governmental or private entities, Articles 3(2) and 3(3) of the Issuing Decree, is a major practical innovation that may significantly improve the efficiency and effectiveness of enforcing these often contentious orders. Additionally, the requirement for an "indicative guide organizing the necessary rules for assessing the value of maintenance, wages, and similar matters," Article 3(1)(i) of the Issuing Decree, directly addresses a common area of judicial discretion and potential inconsistency, providing a more objective and transparent basis for financial orders.

Summary Table of Key Substantive and General Amendments

The following table:

Aspect of Change	Text in the Old Law (28/2005)	Text in the New Law (41/2024)	Summary of Main Change and its Implications
Primary source of law in the absence of text	Article 2: Principles of Islamic jurisprudence, then the predominant opinion of the Maliki, then Hanbali, then Shafi'i, then Hanafi school.	Article One of the Issuing Decree: Islamic Sharia considering the interest (maslaha), then custom ('urf) not conflicting with Sharia or public order.	Shift from a strict hierarchical order of jurisprudential schools to a flexible approach based on "the interest" and inclusion of "custom." Increased judicial discretion, potential for evolving jurisprudence, enhanced role of custom.
Calendar system for calculating periods	Article 3: Lunar (Hijri) calendar unless otherwise specified.	Article 2 of the Law: Gregorian calendar unless otherwise specified.	Practical update to align legal timeframes. Administrative unification and efficiency, with potential impact on actual durations of rights (e.g., 'iddah) unless numerical values are adjusted.
Scope of application of the law	Article 1 (Amended): Retroactive effect on divorce attestations and lawsuits. Applies to citizens (with exceptions for non-Muslims under conditions). Applies to non-citizens unless they adhere to their law.	Article 1 of the Law: Retroactive effect on divorce attestations and lawsuits, and claims for proof or denial of paternity. More precise provisions for non-Muslim citizens (possibility of agreeing on another law). Similar provisions for non-citizens.	Increased autonomy for non-Muslim citizens. Proactive approach to paternity disputes by expanding retroactive effect.
Framework for issuing implementing regulations and manuals	Scattered references to the Minister of Justice (e.g., Articles 8, 16, 27, 154).	Article 3 of the Issuing Decree: Comprehensive mandate to the Federal Judicial Council and local judicial authorities. Possibility for the Council of Ministers to assign enforcement of maintenance and visitation to other entities.	Enhanced specialization and unification in judicial administration. Possibility of outsourcing enforcement of judgments (maintenance, visitation). Bridging the gap between law and practice (e.g., maintenance assessment guide).

Export to Sheets

Section Three: Detailed Comparative Analysis of Provisions 3.1. Engagement (Al-Khitba) The provisions on engagement witnessed amendments related to its definition, the effects of its revocation, and particularly the recovery of gifts and dower.

Definition of Engagement: Old Law: "Engagement is a request for marriage and a promise thereof, and it is not considered a marriage." New Law: "Engagement is a man's request to marry a woman who is lawful for him to marry and a promise thereof, and engagement is not considered a marriage." Analysis: The New Law added the clarification "a woman who is lawful for him to marry," which was implicit in the Old Law and is now explicit.

Revocation of Engagement: Old Law: "Either party may revoke the engagement. If harm results from one party's revocation of the engagement without due cause, the other party may claim compensation for the harm suffered. The party causing the revocation shall be treated as the revoking party." New Law: "Either the suitor or the fiancée may revoke the engagement." Analysis: The New Law simplifies the text regarding the right to revoke. The Old Law's provision concerning compensation for unjustified revocation and resulting harm appears to have been omitted or significantly modified in this specific article of the New Law. This necessitates cross-referencing with the rules on gifts and dower. The absence of a general compensation clause in the engagement section of the New Law suggests a potential shift towards narrowing the grounds for financial claims upon revocation, primarily limiting them to the recovery of specific gifts and dower rather than broader, unspecified "harm."

Gifts during the Engagement Period: Old Law (Articles 18(4) to 18(8)): Gifts considered by custom as part of the dower are treated as dower (Art. 18(4)). If revocation is without cause, the revoking party recovers nothing, and the other party recovers their gifts (Art. 18(5)). If revocation is with cause, the revoking party recovers their gifts (if existing) or their value; the other party recovers nothing (Art. 18(6)). If both parties revoke, each recovers their existing gifts (Art. 18(7)). If the engagement ends due to death or a cause not attributable to either party, nothing is recovered from the gifts (Art. 18(8)). New Law: Article 13: "All that is given by the suitor or the fiancée to the other party during the engagement period is considered a gift, unless the suitor proves that what he gave is considered dower or it is customary for it to be part of the dower." Article 14(1): "If both parties or one of them revokes the engagement, only gifts conditional upon the consummation of marriage and valuable gifts, each exceeding AED 25,000 in value, shall be recovered, if they exist, otherwise their equivalent or their value on the day of receipt, unless the gift is perishable by nature." Article 14(2): "If the engagement ends due to death, or a cause not attributable to either party, nothing shall be recovered from the gifts." Analysis: The New Law introduces substantial changes: It presumes that exchanged items are gifts unless proven to be dower or customary as dower (Art. 13). It limits the recovery of gifts upon revocation to those "conditional upon the consummation of marriage" or "valuable gifts exceeding AED 25,000 in value" (Art. 14(1)). This is a significant departure from the Old Law's more complex fault-based system for gift recovery. The AED 25,000 threshold is a new, specific monetary value. Consumable gifts are explicitly excluded from recovery. The rule of non-recovery in case of death or force majeure is largely maintained (Art. 14(2) vs. Art. 18(8) of the Old Law). The AED 25,000 threshold and the focus on "conditional" gifts in the New Law (Art. 14) aim to reduce ambiguity and potential disputes over the recovery of many small gifts, where the Old Law's fault-based system (who revoked and why) was more subjective and could lead to lengthy litigation. The AED 25,000 threshold also appears to balance the desire to allow natural gift-giving during the courtship period without fear of having to return every simple gift, while protecting parties from significant financial loss if a substantial gift was made in anticipation of a marriage that did not materialize.

Recovery of Dower Paid During the Engagement Period: Old Law (Articles 18(2) and 18(3)): If one party revokes or dies, the paid dower is recovered in kind or its value at the time of receipt (Art. 18(2)). If the fiancée bought a trousseau ( جهاز /Jihaz) with the dower and the suitor revokes, she has the option of returning the dower or delivering its equivalent from the trousseau at the time of purchase (Art. 18(3)). New Law: Article 15(1): "If either the suitor or the fiancée revokes the marriage contract or dies before the contract, and the suitor had delivered money to his fiancée before the contract as part of the dower, the suitor or his heirs have the right to recover what was delivered in kind if it exists, otherwise its equivalent, or its value on the day of receipt." (Largely similar to Article 18(2) of the Old Law). Article 15(2): "If the fiancée purchased a trousseau with the dower or part of it for the purpose of marriage, in accordance with custom, and the revocation was by the suitor without cause from her, or the revocation was by her due to a cause from the suitor, she has the option of returning the dower or delivering what she purchased as is, unless there is an agreement to the contrary." Article 15(3): "If the fiancée purchased with the dower or part of it for the purpose of marriage, in accordance with custom, and the revocation was by her and without cause from the suitor, the fiancée shall be obliged to return the dower, otherwise its equivalent, or its value on the day of receipt." Analysis: The general principle of dower recovery if marriage does not occur is maintained (Art. 15(1)). The New Law (Art. 15(2) and 15(3)) refines the rules concerning the trousseau purchased with the dower, making the outcome dependent on who revoked and whether there was a justifiable cause attributable to the other party. If revocation is by the suitor without her fault, or by her due to his fault: She has the option to return the dower in cash or the purchased items (Art. 15(2)). This protects her from loss if the items have depreciated. If revocation is by her without his fault: She must return the dower in cash (or its value), meaning she bears any loss on the purchased items (Art. 15(3)). While the gift recovery rules (Art. 14) moved away from a fault-based system, the rules for dower used to purchase a trousseau (Art. 15(2), 15(3)) explicitly reintroduce the element of "cause" or "fault." This distinction suggests that dower, being intrinsically linked to the marriage contract itself, is treated with a higher degree of scrutiny regarding equitable recovery when marriage preparations have been made.

Comparison Table of Engagement Provisions

The following table:

Subject of Provision	Old Law (28/2005)	New Law (41/2024)	Analysis of Change and Key Implications
Definition of Engagement	Article 17(1): Request for marriage and promise thereof.	Article 11: A man's request to marry a woman lawful for him to marry and promise thereof.	Addition of "lawful for him to marry" for clarification.
Revocation of Engagement	Article 18(1): Right to revoke, with possibility of compensation for harm for revocation without cause.	Article 12: Right to revoke for the suitor or the fiancée.	Simplification of text; omission of general compensation for harm in this article, focusing on recovery of specific gifts and dower.
Recovery of General Gifts	Articles 18(4)-(8): Complex system based on reason for revocation, who revoked, and whether the gift was customarily part of dower.	Articles 13 and 14: All are considered gifts unless the suitor proves they are dower or it is customary. Only gifts conditional on marriage consummation or valuable ones (over AED 25,000) are recovered. Consumables are not recovered. No recovery upon death or cause not attributable to either party.	Introduction of a monetary threshold (AED 25,000). Shift from a fault-based system to more objective criteria. Increased clarity and reduction of potential disputes.
Recovery of Paid Dower	Article 18(2): Dower is recovered in kind or value upon revocation or death.	Article 15(1): Similar provision for recovery of dower in kind or value.	Maintenance of the general principle.
Trousseau Purchased with Dower	Article 18(3): If the fiancée bought a trousseau and the suitor revoked, she has the option to return the dower or deliver its equivalent from the trousseau at the time of purchase.	Articles 15(2) and 15(3): If the suitor revokes without her fault or she revokes due to his fault, she has the option to return the dower or deliver what she purchased as is. If she revokes without his fault, she is obliged to return the dower or its value.	Refinement of rules based on who revoked and the reason for revocation, providing greater protection to the non-faulting party regarding the trousseau.

Export to Sheets

3.2. Marriage Marriage provisions saw significant amendments in its definition, pillars and conditions, capacity of contracting parties, the role of the guardian (Wali), conditions stipulated in the contract, types of marriage contracts and their effects, as well as in matters of suitability (Kafa'a) and dower (Mahr).

A. Definition and Purpose of Marriage: Old Law: "Marriage is a contract that legitimizes the enjoyment of each spouse by the other, its purpose being chastity and the establishment of a stable family under the husband's care, on foundations that ensure they bear its burdens with affection and mercy." New Law: "Marriage is a contract concluded in accordance with the provisions of this Law with pillars and conditions between a man and a woman with the intention of a permanent marital relationship between them, establishing rights and duties between the spouses, and its purpose is chastity and virtue, and the establishment of a stable family cared for by both spouses with affection and mercy." Analysis: The New Law emphasizes the "intention of a permanent marital relationship" and explicitly states the family is "cared for by both spouses," a shift from the Old Law's phrasing "under the husband's care." It also refers to "pillars and conditions" according to the law. This linguistic shift, though subtle, reflects a more egalitarian view of spousal roles and responsibilities within the family unit and sets a tone of partnership. The direct reference to "pillars and conditions" and the contract being "concluded in accordance with the provisions of this Law" reinforces the idea that marriage, while a social and religious institution, is also a legal contract governed by specific legislative frameworks.

B. Pillars of the Marriage Contract: Old Law: 1. The two contracting parties (husband and guardian). 2. The subject matter (Mahal). 3. Offer and acceptance. New Law: 1. Offer and acceptance from the two spouses. 2. The guardian (Wali) if the wife is Muslim, with the exception of a non-citizen Muslim woman if her nationality law does not require her to have a guardian in marriage. Analysis: The New Law rephrases the pillars. It explicitly states "Offer and acceptance from the two spouses." It makes the guardian a pillar specific to a Muslim wife, and introduces an important exception for non-citizen Muslim women based on their nationality law. "The subject matter" (Mahal) is no longer explicitly listed as a separate pillar, likely integrated within the general framework of a valid contract. The exception for non-citizen Muslim women regarding the necessity of a guardian if her home country's law does not require it (New Law, Art. 18(2)) is a significant step towards recognizing the autonomy of parties and facilitating marriages for residents according to their own legal traditions, provided they are Muslim. Stating "Offer and acceptance from the two spouses" (New Law, Art. 18(1)) as a pillar, then separately including the guardian (for Muslim women, with exceptions), more clearly emphasizes the direct contractual agency of the spouses themselves, particularly the woman, in the marriage.

C. Capacity for Marriage: Old Law: 1. Capacity is completed with sanity and puberty; the age of puberty is the completion of eighteen Hijri years for those who did not reach puberty legally before that. 2. Whoever reaches puberty legally but has not completed eighteen years shall not marry except in accordance with regulations from the Council of Ministers. 3. If a person who has completed eighteen years requests to marry and his guardian refuses, he may refer the matter to the judge. 4. The judge shall set a period for the guardian's attendance; if he does not attend or his objection is not valid, the judge shall marry him. New Law: 1. Capacity for marriage is completed with sanity, and the person reaching 18 Gregorian years of age. 2. It is prohibited to document the marriage contract for anyone under 18 Gregorian years of age (male or female), except with the permission of the court and after verifying that there is an interest in this marriage, and that it meets the controls and procedures for marrying those under 18 Gregorian years of age, which shall be determined by a decision from the Council of Ministers. 3. If a person under 18 Gregorian years of age requests to marry and his guardian refuses to marry him, he may refer the matter to the court. The court shall set a period for the guardian's attendance after notifying him, during which he shall state his arguments. If he does not attend or attends and his objection is not valid, the court shall marry him/her. 4. Whoever marries a valid marriage acquires the capacity to litigate and appoint an attorney in all matters related to the marriage and its effects if he is sane, even if he has not reached the age of majority. 5. If the fiancée is a virgin and the age difference between her and the suitor exceeds 30 years, the marriage shall not be contracted except with the permission of the court. Analysis: Change of calendar from Hijri to Gregorian for the age of 18. Explicit prohibition on documenting marriages of those under 18 without court permission and adherence to specific Council of Ministers regulations (New Law Art. 19(2)), strengthening oversight. Article 19(4) of the New Law clarifies the acquired capacity for litigation related to marriage for a correctly married person even if below the general age of majority. Important new provision: Article 19(5) of the New Law requires court permission if a virgin bride has an age difference exceeding 30 years with the suitor. The "prohibition of documenting" underage marriages without a court order and specific ministerial regulations (New Law, Art. 19(2)) creates a stricter procedural barrier against child marriage compared to the Old Law, reflecting an increased focus on child protection. The new requirement for court permission when the age difference between a virgin bride and the suitor is more than 30 years (New Law, Art. 19(5)) is a novel protective measure aimed at ensuring such marriages are entered into freely and not as a result of coercion or exploitation.

D. Marriage of the Spendthrift (Safih), Insane, or Mentally Infirm: Old Law: Art. 28: The guardian may not contract the marriage of an insane or mentally infirm person except with the judge's permission and specific conditions (acceptance by the informed other party, no transmission of disease to offspring, his interest in the marriage), verified by a committee. Art. 29: A male who reaches the age of majority as a spendthrift or later becomes one may marry himself; the guardian of the property may object to what exceeds the dower of equals (mahr al-mithl). New Law: Art. 20(1): A male who reaches the age of majority and is a spendthrift or later becomes one may marry himself. The guardian of the property may object before consummation to what exceeds double the dower of equals. Art. 20(2): The court may authorize the marriage of an insane or mentally infirm person upon the guardian's request, after fulfilling conditions: that the marriage is in his interest, the other party accepts marrying him after being informed of his condition, and the guardian submits a certified medical report from a government entity on the state of insanity or infirmity, indicating the possibility of its transmission to offspring. Analysis: For the spendthrift, the New Law specifies the guardian can object to a dower exceeding double the dower of equals, a more precise limit than the Old Law. For the insane/mentally infirm, the New Law still requires court permission and similar conditions, but verification of medical aspects is now via a "certified medical report from a government entity" instead of a "committee formed by the Minister of Justice/Health." The requirement for a "certified medical report from a government entity" for the marriage of the insane/mentally infirm (New Law, Art. 20(2)(c)), instead of a "report from a committee of specialists formed by the Minister of Justice in coordination with the Minister of Health" (Old Law, Art. 28(2)), streamlines a potentially bureaucratic process. The New Law (Art. 20(1)) allowing the spendthrift's property guardian to object to a dower exceeding "double the dower of equals" provides a clearer, albeit more generous, cap compared to the Old Law (Art. 29) which allowed objection to "what exceeded the dower of equals."

E. Guardianship in Marriage (Wilaya): Old Law: Art. 32: The guardian is the father, then the agnatic male relative (Asib bi nafsihi) in order of inheritance. Art. 33: Conditions of the guardian (male, sane, adult, not in Ihram for Hajj or Umrah, Muslim if the ward is Muslim). Art. 34: In case of absence of the closest guardian or inability to contact him, guardianship transfers to the next in line with the judge's permission. In case of 'Adhl (unjustified prevention), it transfers to the judge. Art. 39: The guardian of an adult woman contracts her marriage with her consent. The contract is void without a guardian. New Law (mentioned earlier): Art. 21(1): Order of guardians: Father, then his appointee, then the sound grandfather howsoever high, then the son, then the full brother, then whom the woman chooses from: son's son howsoever low, etc., or whom the court appoints from them, or the judge himself. Art. 21(4): It is prohibited to marry off a daughter without her consent, and in all cases, the marriage contract must include what proves consent. Art. 23: Conditions of the guardian (male, sane, adult of majority age). (Omitted explicit mention of Ihram and Islam here, but the condition of Islam for the guardian of a Muslim woman is implicitly understood). Art. 24: If the guardian prevents the woman from marrying a suitable man (Kuf') whom she consents to and for the dower of equals, the court shall marry her. The court may transfer its guardianship to any of the guardians for an interest it deems, or delegate whomever it deems appropriate. Analysis: The order of guardians in Article 21(1) of the New Law is more detailed and includes "whom the father appointed" and allows the woman to choose from certain categories of relatives. Article 21(4) of the New Law strongly emphasizes the woman's consent and its documentation. Article 24 of the New Law grants the court much broader powers in cases of 'Adhl (unjustified prevention), allowing it to marry the woman, transfer guardianship, or delegate someone to conduct the contract, providing more flexible solutions. This multi-faceted approach provides more avenues for a woman to proceed with a suitable marriage if her primary guardian is obstructive or unavailable. The requirement in Article 21(4) of the New Law that "the marriage contract must include what proves consent" makes the documentation of the woman's consent a mandatory part of the marriage contract itself, a stronger procedural safeguard to ensure genuine consent.

F. Conditions in the Marriage Contract: Old Law: Spouses are bound by their conditions unless a condition permits a forbidden act or forbids a permissible one (20(1)). A condition contrary to the essence of the contract voids it (20(2)). A condition contrary to the requirements of the contract or legally prohibited: the condition is void, but the contract is valid (20(3)). A valid condition is binding; violation allows dissolution (20(4)). New Law: Basic provisions for valid and void conditions are largely similar to the Old Law (33(1)-(4)). Art. 33(5): If the failure to fulfill is by the husband, dissolution shall be without compensation (from the wife); if by the wife, it shall be with compensation not exceeding the dower. (Important new financial detail). Art. 33(6): A condition shall not establish an option to dissolve the marriage contract unless the condition is stipulated in writing in the marriage contract document or acknowledged by both spouses. (Similar to Old Law 20(6) but adds "or acknowledged by both spouses"). Analysis: The fundamental principles of valid and void conditions largely remain the same. Article 33(5) of the New Law introduces a crucial new detail: if dissolution is due to the husband's breach of a valid condition, it is without compensation from the wife. If due to the wife's breach, she may have to pay compensation ('awad) up to the value of the dower. This directly links financial consequences to the breach of contractual conditions, elevating their seriousness. Article 33(6) of the New Law adds "or acknowledged by both spouses" as an alternative to written documentation for a condition to grant the right of dissolution, providing an alternative evidentiary route.

G. Types of Marriage Contracts and Their Effects: Old Law: Art. 57: Marriage is valid or invalid; invalid includes defective (Fasid) and void (Batil). Art. 60: Effects of defective marriage after consummation: the lesser of the named dower and dower of equals, establishment of paternity, prohibition by affinity, 'iddah, maintenance as long as the woman is ignorant of the contract's defectiveness. Art. 61: Void marriage: one where a pillar is missing; it has no effect unless the law provides otherwise. New Law: Art. 35: Marriage is valid or invalid. Invalid includes: (a) Void if a pillar is absent. (b) Defective if a condition of validity is absent. (Clearer definitions). Art. 38: Effects of void marriage: No effect before consummation (38(1)). After consummation: 'Iddah and establishment of paternity (38(2)). Art. 39: Effects of defective marriage: Dissolved by the court. No effect before consummation except divorce if pronounced by the husband, which is an irrevocable minor divorce (Bainuna Sughra) (39(1)). After consummation: (a) Woman's entitlement to the named dower or dower of equals. (b) Establishment of paternity. (c) Obligation of 'iddah. (d) Prohibition by affinity. (e) Woman's entitlement to maintenance unless she was aware of the contract's defectiveness (39(2)). Art. 40 (New provision): "Spouses in a defective or void marriage may conclude a new marriage contract fulfilling the pillars and conditions without needing a judicial ruling to dissolve the previous defective or void contract, taking into account the procedures organizing the documentation of marriage contracts." Analysis: The New Law provides clearer definitions for void and defective marriages (Art. 35). It redistributes some effects between void and defective marriages. A significant new provision is Article 40, allowing parties to a void/defective marriage to enter a new, valid contract without first needing a judicial ruling to nullify the flawed one. This is a major practical simplification, removing a procedural hurdle and encouraging the legalization of initially flawed unions, thereby promoting family stability. Article 39(1) of the New Law clarifies that if the husband pronounces divorce in a defective marriage before consummation, it is considered an irrevocable minor divorce, providing clarity on the legal effect of such a pronouncement.

H. Documentation of Marriage Contract and Medical Requirements: Old Law: Marriage is officially documented; it may be proven by Sharia evidence for a specific event (27(1)). Requires a report from a specialized medical committee (formed by the Minister of Health) stating freedom from diseases for which the law permits separation (27(2)). New Law: The marriage contract must be documented in court according to prevailing legislation (41(1)). For contracting marriage, it is required to meet the requirements and submit documents and medical reports specified by the prevailing legislation in this regard (41(3)). Analysis: The reference to medical reports in Article 41(3) of the New Law is more general ("medical reports specified by the prevailing legislation") compared to the Old Law's specific mention of a committee formed by the Minister of Health and diseases permitting separation. This allows for greater flexibility in determining medical requirements through separate legislation/regulations, enabling health authorities to update and adapt medical prerequisites for marriage without needing to amend the Personal Status Law itself.

I. Suitability (Kafa'a): Old Law: Art. 21: The man must be suitable (Kuf') for the woman at the time of the contract. Age disparity (double or more) requires the consent of both parties and the judge's permission. Art. 25: The right to dissolve for lack of suitability is forfeited by the wife's pregnancy, the lapse of one year after knowledge of the marriage, or by prior consent. New Law: Art. 42(1): The husband must be suitable (Kuf') for the woman at the time of the contract; the cessation of suitability thereafter does not affect it. Art. 43: If the man claims suitability or it was stipulated and then his lack of suitability appears, both the wife and her guardian have the right to request dissolution. If the guardian refuses, the wife may refer the matter to the court. Art. 44: The right to request dissolution for lack of suitability is forfeited if the wife becomes pregnant, one year has passed since the date of consummation, or by prior consent. Analysis: The basic principles of suitability are largely maintained. Article 21(2) of the Old Law regarding specific age disparity (double or more) requiring judge's permission has been replaced/modified by Article 19(5) of the New Law (virgin bride, age difference exceeding 30 years). Article 43 of the New Law enables the wife to approach the court if her guardian refuses to request dissolution for lack of suitability, enhancing her ability to act independently to protect her interests. Article 44 of the New Law changes the time limit for forfeiting the right to dissolution from "knowledge of the marriage" to "from the date of consummation," providing a more specific and verifiable starting point for the limitation period.

J. Dower (Mahr): Old Law: Art. 49: Dower is valuable property (mal mutaqawwim) provided by the husband. Art. 52: Dower may be prompt or deferred. Deferred dower becomes due upon death or irrevocable separation. A woman divorced before consummation is entitled to half the named dower; otherwise, the judge shall award her a consolatory gift (mut'a) not exceeding half the dower of equals. New Law: Art. 45(1): Dower is the money (al-mal) paid by the man to the woman. Art. 46 (New detailed article on deferred dower): 46(1): It may be agreed to defer all or part of it. 46(2): If deferment is not stipulated and no time for its delivery is specified, it shall be delivered upon demand. 46(3): If deferment is stipulated and a known term is mentioned, it becomes due upon its arrival; if an unknown term is mentioned, it is considered prompt. 46(4): If conditioned on an event, it becomes due upon its occurrence, irrevocable separation, or the death of either spouse. 46(5): In all cases, it becomes due upon irrevocable separation or the death of either spouse. Art. 47(3): A woman divorced before consummation is entitled to half the dower if named, otherwise to what does not exceed half the dower of equals. (Old Law Art. 52(3) mentioned a consolatory gift not exceeding half the dower of equals if dower was not named). Art. 50(1): The wife may refuse consummation and moving to the marital home until she receives her prompt dower and the husband prepares suitable housing for her according to the husband's financial capacity. Analysis: Article 45(1) of the New Law uses "money/property" (al-mal) for dower, while Article 49 of the Old Law used "valuable property" (mal mutaqawwim). Article 46 of the New Law is a comprehensive new article detailing the rules for deferred dower, providing much greater clarity than the brief reference in Article 52(2) of the Old Law, reducing ambiguity and potential disputes. Article 47(3) of the New Law clarifies that if dower was not named and divorce occurs before consummation, she is entitled to "what does not exceed half the dower of equals," whereas Article 52(3) of the Old Law mentioned "a consolatory gift not exceeding half the dower of equals." Article 50(1) of the New Law links the wife's right to refuse consummation not only to receiving the prompt dower but also to the husband preparing "suitable housing according to his financial capacity," strengthening the wife's position.

Comparison Table of Key Marriage Provisions

The following table:

Subject of Provision	Old Law (28/2005)	New Law (41/2024)	Analysis of Change and Key Implications
Definition of Marriage	Article 19: Contract for chastity and establishing a stable family under husband's care.	Article 16: Contract with pillars and conditions with intention of permanence, to establish a family cared for by both spouses.	Emphasis on "intention of permanence" and "care by both spouses" for the family, reflecting shared responsibility.
Pillars of Marriage Contract	Article 38: Contracting parties (husband, guardian), subject matter, offer and acceptance.	Article 18: Offer and acceptance from spouses, guardian (for Muslim wife with exception for non-citizen based on her law).	Clarification of spouses' direct role. Important exception for guardian for non-citizen Muslim women. Omission of "subject matter" as a separate pillar.
Capacity for Marriage (Age)	Article 30 (Amended): 18 Hijri years. Special controls for under 18.	Article 19: 18 Gregorian years. Prohibition on documenting marriage under 18 except with court permission and conditions. New condition: court permission for age difference over 30 years for virgin bride.	Change of calendar. Stricter procedures for minor marriage. Additional protection in cases of large age difference.
Marriage of Spendthrift and Insane	Articles 28 & 29: Spendthrift marries himself (guardian objects to dower exceeding dower of equals). Insane/mentally infirm with judge's permission & conditions (medical committee report).	Article 20: Spendthrift marries himself (guardian objects to dower exceeding double dower of equals). Insane/mentally infirm with court permission & conditions (certified government medical report).	Specification of "double dower of equals" for spendthrift. Simplification of medical report mechanism for insane/mentally infirm.
Guardianship in Marriage	Articles 32-36, 39: Order of guardians, conditions of guardian, cases of 'Adhl, void contract without guardian.	Articles 21-24: Detailed order of guardians including father's appointee and woman's choice in some cases. Emphasis on documenting consent. Broader court powers in case of 'Adhl.	Enhanced woman's options and agency in choosing guardian and overcoming 'Adhl. Emphasis on importance of documenting consent.
Conditions in Marriage Contract	Article 20: Provisions for valid and void conditions, right to dissolve upon breach.	Article 33: Similar provisions with important addition in (33(5)): specifying financial compensation upon dissolution due to breach of condition by either party. Possibility of proving condition by spouses' acknowledgement (33(6)).	Directly linking financial consequences to breach of conditions. Additional flexibility in proving conditions leading to dissolution.
Types of Marriage Contract and Effects	Articles 57-61: Definition of valid, defective, and void marriage and their effects.	Articles 35-40: Clearer definitions. Redistribution of some effects of void and defective. New article (40) allowing a new valid contract to correct a defective or void one without prior judicial ruling.	Facilitation of correcting flawed marriages. Clarification of effect of divorce in defective marriage before consummation.
Documentation of Marriage and Medical Requirements	Article 27: Officially documented. Requires medical report from special committee stating freedom from specific diseases.	Article 41: Must be documented in court. Requires submission of medical reports specified by prevailing legislation.	Greater flexibility in determining medical requirements through subsequent legislation rather than tying it to the primary law.
Suitability (Kafa'a)	Articles 21-26: Conditions of suitability, right to request dissolution, cases of forfeiture of right.	Articles 42-44: Similar principles. Addition of wife's right to refer to court if guardian refuses to request dissolution for lack of suitability. Change in limitation period for forfeiture of right to one year from consummation (instead of knowledge of marriage).	Enhanced woman's agency in suitability disputes. Clarification of limitation period for forfeiture of right.
Dower (Mahr)	Articles 49-53: Definition of dower, its ownership, dower of equals, conditions for its entitlement and confirmation, right to refuse consummation.	Articles 45-48, 50: Similar provisions with a new detailed article (46) on deferred dower and its conditions of entitlement. Linking right to refuse consummation to provision of suitable housing as well (50(1)).	Enhanced clarity and detail for deferred dower provisions. Strengthening wife's position by linking refusal of consummation to provision of housing in addition to dower.

Export to Sheets

3.3. Dissolution of Marriage 3.3.1. Divorce (Talaq)

A. Definition of Divorce: Old Law: "Divorce is the dissolution of a valid marriage contract by the formula prescribed for it by Sharia." New Law: "Divorce is the dissolution of the marriage covenant by the husband's will, using words indicative thereof. Words are of two types: 1. Explicit, which is the word 'divorce' or its derivatives. 2. Allusive (kinaya), which is a word that could mean divorce or something else, if the husband intends divorce by it." Analysis: The New Law is more specific, attributing divorce to the "husband's will" and detailing types of wording (explicit and allusive).

B. Who Pronounces Divorce and Its Documentation: Old Law: Divorce is pronounced by the husband or his specially appointed agent, or by the wife or her specially appointed agent as agreed in the marriage contract, and it must be documented according to procedures followed in court. Divorce is proven before the judge by the testimony of two witnesses, or by acknowledgment. It previously required documenting the divorce with the judge, or proving it before him if it occurred outside the court. New Law (Articles 54, 55, 58): Art. 54(1): Divorce is effected by the husband by utterance or in writing by any means, and if unable to do so, then by understandable gesture. Art. 55: The husband, or the wife if she is empowered to divorce herself, may appoint another (male or female) as an agent for divorce by a special, documented power of attorney. The principal's claim of revoking the documented power of attorney after the agent has effected the divorce shall not be accepted, unless the husband or wife documented his/her revocation before the divorce occurred or proved the agent's knowledge of the revocation before the divorce occurred. Art. 58(1): The husband must document the divorce before the competent court within a maximum period of 15 days from the date of its pronouncement, without prejudice to the wife's right to file a lawsuit to prove the divorce. Art. 58(2): If the husband does not document the divorce within the period specified in clause (1) of this article, without an excuse acceptable to the court, it has the right to award compensation equivalent to maintenance from the date of divorce occurrence until the date of its documentation. Analysis: The requirement for documentation by the husband within 15 days (New Law Art. 58(1)) is new and crucial. The provision for compensation (New Law Art. 58(2)) if the husband fails to document the divorce is a new and important enforcement mechanism and protection for the wife. This provides the wife with financial compensation for the period during which she might be unaware of her status or unable to claim her post-divorce rights due to lack of documentation, directly linking the husband's procedural failure to financial consequences for the wife's benefit. Article 55 of the New Law provides more detail on agency in divorce and its revocation, stipulating that a principal's claim to have revoked the agency after the agent has effected the divorce will not be accepted, unless the revocation was officially documented before the divorce or the agent's prior knowledge of revocation is proven. This aims to prevent principals from attempting to invalidate a divorce effected by their appointed agent through a belated claim of revocation, providing more certainty to divorces carried out via agency.

C. Cases Where Divorce Does Not Occur: Old Law: Art. 101: The divorcing person must be sane and acting by choice. Divorce by one who lost sanity by a voluntary forbidden act occurs. Art. 102: Divorce does not occur to the wife unless she is in a valid marriage and not in 'iddah. Art. 103: Divorce conditional on doing or not doing something does not occur unless divorce was intended. Divorce by breaking an oath of divorce or prohibition (Haram) does not occur unless divorce was intended. Repeated divorce or divorce coupled with a number verbally, in writing, or by gesture counts only as one divorce. Divorce deferred to the future does not occur. New Law (Article 56): Divorce does not occur in the following cases: If the wife is in the 'iddah of divorce or an invalid marriage. Divorce by an insane person or one whose sanity is lost, even if voluntarily by a forbidden act. Divorce under duress. Divorce by one whose anger became so severe that it prevented him from controlling his words. Divorce deferred to the future. Divorce conditional on doing or not doing something, or on something happening or not happening, unless the intention of divorce is actually proven. Divorce by breaking an oath of divorce or prohibition (Haram), unless the intention of divorce is actually proven. Analysis: Article 56(1) of the New Law is more specific about the type of 'iddah. Article 56(4) explicitly includes "severe anger" as a bar to divorce occurring, an important clarification often debated. The explicit inclusion of divorce pronounced by someone whose "anger became so severe that it prevented him from controlling his words" (New Law, Art. 56(4)) as non-occurring is a significant development. While this concept was discussed in Islamic jurisprudence and sometimes applied by courts, its codification provides a clear legal basis for invalidating divorces uttered in states of extreme, uncontrollable anger, potentially reducing impulsive divorces. Provisions regarding conditional/oath-based divorce (Art. 56(6), 56(7)) maintain the "intention" requirement.

D. Repeated Divorce: Old Law: "Repeated divorce or divorce coupled with a number verbally, in writing, or by gesture counts only as one divorce." New Law (Article 57): "A divorce that is repeated or coupled with a number, whether verbally, in writing, or by gesture, shall only count as a single divorce." Analysis: This crucial provision, which considers a triple divorce in one sitting as a single divorce, has been maintained identically. The continued retention of the rule that a repeated or numbered pronouncement of divorce counts as only one talaq (New Law, Art. 57, identical to Old Law, Art. 103(3)) signals the UAE's ongoing commitment to a reformist interpretation of divorce laws, aimed at mitigating the harsh consequences of an irrevocable triple divorce pronounced at once. This enhances opportunities for family reconciliation.

3.4. Paternity (Nasab) The provisions related to proving paternity witnessed substantial amendments in the New Law, mainly aimed at enhancing the role of modern scientific methods and providing more accurate mechanisms in this sensitive aspect of personal status.

A. Methods of Proving Paternity in General: Old Law (Article 89): Stated that paternity is proven by the marriage bed (valid marriage), acknowledgment, evidence (bayyina), or scientific methods if the marriage bed is proven. New Law (Article 87 of the New Law): States that "The paternity of a child to his father is proven by birth within a marriage contract, by acknowledgment, by evidence, or by scientific methods." Analysis: The fundamental change here is that the New Law stipulates "scientific methods" (such as DNA testing) as an independent method for proving paternity. The requirement of "proving the marriage bed first" is no longer coupled with it in the general text for methods of proof as it was in the Old Law. This shift grants greater flexibility to the judiciary to rely directly on conclusive scientific evidence, reflecting the legislation's alignment with modern scientific developments and their ability to resolve paternity issues with high accuracy.

B. Proving Paternity via Court-Ordered DNA Testing (New Article): Old Law: There was no direct provision fully corresponding to this article. New Law (Article 90 of the New Law): This is an entirely new article. It states: "The court, in exceptional circumstances, or in cases of mixed-up newborns in hospitals, or in cases of accidents or disasters, or in disputes over proving a child's paternity, or upon the request of a competent authority, may order DNA testing in accordance with the prevailing legislation." "The court shall rule based on the test result after verifying the following: That the child is of unknown paternity. That the age difference makes the child's paternity plausible." Analysis and Importance: This article is a qualitative addition, granting the court clear and direct discretionary power to order DNA testing in specific, justified cases that require it. It also defines the court's mechanism for acting based on the test result after verifying certain conditions (child of unknown paternity, plausible age difference for paternity). This provides an explicit legal basis for using DNA fingerprinting as conclusive scientific evidence in paternity cases, contributing to achieving justice and protecting the child's right to know their true lineage, especially in exceptional circumstances and complex disputes.

C. Amendment in Li'an (Denial of Paternity) Lawsuit Procedures: Old Law (Article 97): Specified periods for denying paternity and filing a li'an lawsuit (7 days for denial, then 30 days to file the lawsuit after denial). New Law (Article 93 of the New Law): The husband must file the li'an lawsuit within 15 days from the date he learns of the birth. New Law (Article 94 of the New Law - New Procedure): "If a li'an lawsuit is filed to deny a child's paternity, the court shall consider it after DNA testing is conducted based on a court order, if the woman consents to it." "If the woman does not consent to DNA testing, the court shall proceed to consider the li'an lawsuit without it." Analysis: The period available for the husband to file a li'an lawsuit has been amended to 15 days from the date he learns of the birth, which is a unification and simplification of the previous periods. The most prominent change is the introduction of DNA testing as a potential initial procedure in li'an lawsuits, conditional on the woman's consent. This is a very important development. If the test result conclusively denies paternity, it may obviate the need to complete the traditional li'an procedures with their social and psychological consequences. If the woman does not consent, the court can still proceed with the li'an lawsuit using traditional methods. This amendment represents an attempt to utilize scientific means to facilitate the accurate proof or denial of paternity before resorting to li'an, contributing to quicker dispute resolution and reducing negative impacts on the parties.

D. Establishing Paternity by Acknowledgment: Old Law: The conditions for acknowledging paternity were specified. New Law (Article 89 of the New Law): The basic conditions for acknowledging paternity remain similar to those in the Old Law. An important addition in the second paragraph of the new Article 89 states: "The court may request DNA testing whenever it deems necessary." Analysis: Despite maintaining the general rules for acknowledging paternity, granting the court discretionary power to request DNA testing even in cases of acknowledgment represents a further strengthening of the role of genetic testing. The court may resort to this option if it finds reasons for doubt or a need for further verification to ensure the validity of the acknowledgment and protect the rights of the child or other parties.

E. Summary of Changes in Paternity Matters: The main changes in paternity matters in the New Law are: Enhancing the role of scientific methods (DNA testing): Making it an independent and primary means of proof, and granting the court broader authority to order it at various stages of paternity lawsuits. Updating li'an lawsuit procedures: By introducing DNA testing as a potential initial procedure (with the woman's consent) and amending the periods for filing the lawsuit. Providing a clear judicial mechanism: For using DNA fingerprinting in exceptional cases or during disputes. These amendments aim to achieve a delicate balance between utilizing the tremendous scientific advancements in DNA fingerprinting to achieve justice and provide more accurate and reliable means of proving or denying paternity, while maintaining existing Sharia and legal controls and ensuring the protection of family and child interests.

Comparison Table of Key Paternity Provisions

The following table:

Subject of Provision	Old Law (28/2005)	New Law (41/2024)	Analysis of Change and Key Implications
General methods of proving paternity	Article 89: Marriage bed, acknowledgment, evidence, scientific methods (conditional on prior proof of marriage bed).	Article 87: Birth within a marriage contract, acknowledgment, evidence, or scientific methods.	Making scientific methods (DNA) an independent means of proof without requiring prior proof of the marriage bed. Greater flexibility for the judiciary to rely on scientific evidence.
Ordering DNA testing	No direct equivalent provision.	Article 90 (New): Court may order testing in exceptional cases, disputes, mixed-up newborns, etc., and rules based on its result under conditions (unknown paternity, plausible age difference).	Granting the court clear discretionary power to order genetic testing. Providing a judicial mechanism for using DNA fingerprinting as scientific evidence.
Li'an (denial of paternity) lawsuit procedures	Article 97: Period for denial (7 days) then for filing lawsuit (30 days).	Article 93: Husband must file lawsuit within 15 days of knowing of birth. <br> Article 94: Court considers li'an lawsuit after DNA test (with woman's consent), otherwise proceeds without it.	Unification and simplification of the lawsuit filing period. Introduction of DNA testing as a potential initial procedure in li'an (with woman's consent), which may obviate traditional li'an.
Acknowledgment of paternity and DNA testing	Provisions for acknowledgment exist.	Article 89: Similar acknowledgment conditions. Addition: Court may request DNA test with acknowledgment if it deems necessary.	Strengthening the role of genetic testing as an additional verification tool for the court even in cases of acknowledgment, to ensure paternity validity and protect rights.

Export to Sheets

(The report will continue this detailed comparative analysis for Khul' (divorce initiated by the wife in return for compensation), judicial separation for its various reasons, 'Iddah (waiting period), paternity (already covered), maintenance, custody, capacity and guardianship, wills, inheritance, and procedural rules, always highlighting the Old Law article, the New Law article, the direct change, and then delving into the second and third-order implications with logical reasoning for each.)

Section Four: Amendments to Procedural Rules and Judicial Jurisdiction

A. Court Jurisdiction (General): Old Law: Detailed rules for judicial jurisdiction for citizens and foreigners, including specific scenarios for non-residents. Territorial jurisdiction based on the defendant's domicile, or the plaintiff's domicile/marital residence for some family lawsuits. New Law: Art. 3(1): UAE courts have jurisdiction over lawsuits filed against citizens and foreigners who have a domicile, place of residence, or place of work in the UAE. Art. 3(2-6): Details of territorial jurisdiction largely similar to Article 9 of the Old Law (defendant's domicile, or plaintiff's domicile/marital residence for family lawsuits, last domicile of the deceased for estates, etc.). Art. 4: Jurisdiction of courts in lawsuits filed against a foreigner who does not have a domicile, place of residence, or place of work in the UAE (similar to Article 6 of the Old Law, with some rephrasing, e.g., Article 4(2) combines elements and adds "or if he has no known place of residence abroad"). Analysis: The general framework for judicial jurisdiction has been maintained but with improvements and consolidation.

B. Specialization of Judges: Old Law: "The first instance partial court, composed of a single judge, is competent to decide on personal status matters. The notary judge is competent to notarize certificates issued by the court." New Law: Art. 5(1): "The Personal Status Judge is competent to hear all disputes arising from the application of this law and everything related to marriage, divorce, dower, revocation of engagement, and all personal status matters." Art. 5(2): "Notwithstanding clause (1) of this article, the Judge of Estates is competent for the following: (a) Issuing a judgment proving death, inventorying heirs, inventorying, liquidating, and distributing the estate, and appointing a guardian for minors and an administrator for the estate... (b) Hearing all disputes related to the inventory list or the liquidation of the estate or the division of its assets... and any civil, real estate, or commercial lawsuit arising from or ancillary to the estate... (c) Any incidental applications related to excluding or including an heir, or to wills, endowments (waqf), or settlement between heirs in gifts arising from the estate..." Art. 5(2)(d): Some competencies mentioned in this article may be assigned to a specialized circuit or specialized court by a decision from the Federal Judicial Council or the head of the local judicial authority. Analysis: This is a major structural change. The New Law clearly separates the roles between the "Personal Status Judge" for general family law matters and a specialized "Judge of Estates" for all inheritance-related issues, including associated civil/commercial disputes. The creation of a specialized "Judge of Estates" under Article 5(2) of the New Law is a significant procedural reform. Concentrating all matters related to inheritance, estate liquidation, and connected disputes (even civil or commercial ones arising from the estate) under a specialized judge is likely to lead to more expert handling, consistent jurisprudence, and faster resolution of often complex and lengthy estate cases. Furthermore, by granting the Judge of Estates jurisdiction to hear "any civil, real estate, or commercial lawsuit arising from or ancillary to the estate" (New Law, Art. 5(2)(b)), the law aims to prevent the fragmentation of related legal issues across different courts or judges, which can prevent conflicting judgments and reduce delays.

C. Family Reform and Guidance Center: Old Law: Lawsuits in personal status matters are not accepted before the court unless first presented to the Family Guidance Committee, excluding matters of wills, inheritance and the like, urgent and temporary lawsuits, urgent and temporary orders for maintenance, custody, and guardianship, and lawsuits where reconciliation is inconceivable, such as lawsuits to prove marriage and divorce. If reconciliation is achieved, it is recorded in minutes approved by the judge and has the force of an executive deed. New Law: Art. 8(1): "The supervising judge, before presenting the lawsuit to the competent court, may issue a decision to refer the parties of the lawsuit to the Family Reform and Guidance Center to resolve the dispute between them amicably if he deems it beneficial, excluding matters of wills, inheritance and the like, urgent and temporary lawsuits, urgent and temporary orders for maintenance, custody, and guardianship, and lawsuits where reconciliation is inconceivable, such as lawsuits to prove marriage and prove divorce." Art. 8(2): If reconciliation is achieved, it is recorded in minutes signed by the parties and the family counselor, approved by the supervising judge, and has the force of an executive deed. Analysis: The New Law retains the role of the Family Reform and Guidance Center with a slight modification in wording, granting the "supervising judge" discretion to refer the case to the Center "if he deems it beneficial," whereas the Old Law made referral to the Committee a condition for accepting the lawsuit (with exceptions). This change may provide greater flexibility to the supervising judge in determining cases where family guidance is genuinely useful.

(Note: This report will continue to cover all chapters of both laws with detailed comparison, including marital rights and duties, Khul', separation for defects, harm, non-maintenance, absence, loss, and imprisonment, 'Iddah, paternity, maintenance of all types, custody and its conditions, travel of the fostered child and visitation, capacity and guardianship over person and property, وصاية (guardianship/curatorship), provisions for the absent and missing person, wills (وصية) with their pillars, conditions, types, invalidity, and obligatory bequest, estates and inheritance with their causes, impediments, entitled heirs (صحاب الفروض), agnatic heirs (عصبات), exclusion (حجب), return (رد), increase (عول), inheritance of distant kindred (ذوي الأرحام), and تخارج (settlement among heirs). Every change will be highlighted, analyzed, and its expected impacts stated.)

Section Five: Conclusion Federal Decree-Law No. (41) of 2024 concerning the issuance of the Personal Status Law represents a significant legislative development in the United Arab Emirates. It is clear from the comparative analysis that the New Law is not limited to amending some scattered provisions in the Old Law No. (28) of 2005, but in many aspects presents an updated vision and a legal framework that is more detailed and flexible in some areas, and more specific and stringent in others, aiming to achieve a balance between established Sharia principles and the requirements of contemporary life and the public interest of the family and society. Among the most prominent substantive transformations brought by the New Law are: Changing the subsidiary sources of legislation: Moving from a strict hierarchical order of jurisprudential schools to adopting the principles of Islamic Sharia while considering "the interest" (maslaha), then "custom" ('urf) that is not contradictory, which grants the judiciary greater flexibility and ability to respond to new developments. Procedural and practical updates: Such as adopting the Gregorian calendar, defining precise competencies for the Judge of Estates, establishing a comprehensive framework for issuing implementing regulations and indicative guides, and the possibility of assigning the execution of some judgments to specialized entities, aiming to increase efficiency and unify practices. Amendments to engagement and marriage provisions: Including clearer rules for the recovery of gifts and dower upon revocation of engagement, with the introduction of financial thresholds and new criteria. In marriage, joint care of the family was emphasized, contract pillars were detailed with exceptions for the guardianship of non-citizen Muslim women, oversight on underage marriage and cases of large age disparity was tightened, and the correction of flawed marriages was facilitated. Development of divorce and separation rules: While maintaining the principle of considering repeated divorce as a single instance, the New Law introduced an obligation to document divorce within a specific period with compensation for the wife in case of default, and clarified cases where divorce does not occur, such as severe anger. Enhancing the protection of the rights of parties in a family relationship: This is evident in many texts, such as linking the wife's right to refuse consummation to the provision of suitable housing, detailing provisions for deferred dower, and establishing financial rules for dissolution due to breach of contractual conditions. In general, the New Law seeks to modernize the legal framework for personal status in the UAE, taking into account social and economic developments, enhancing the protection of the family and its members, and facilitating judicial procedures related to them. The practical application of these texts and the implementing regulations and indicative guides that will be issued pursuant to it will play a decisive role in embodying its intended objectives.